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I.

Introduction

In the English-speaking world, headlines including the word “Mexico” are rarely a cause
for celebration. The standard topics are ubiquitous enough to hardly bear mentioning:
northbound migration, horrific violence, organized crime and the drug trade all feature with
regularity. It may be a surprise to modern readers, then, that there was a time when many
American observers saw great hope in Mexico.1 This wave of hope rose with the Mexican
Revolution (1910-1920), and slowly crashed, rolling back in the years after 1940, when the
presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas ended and the era of “counter-reform” began.2 Even after 1940,
the hopes of American observers hinged on Cárdenas—or, rather, the dream that his successors
would follow in his footsteps. The historians Watt Stewart and Harold Peterson included
Cárdenas in their 1942 book Builders of Latin America as a positive example not just for Mexico
but for the rest of Latin America.3 Moreover, as late as 1950, the eminent Mexicanist Frank
Tannenbaum expressed his tentative hope that Mexico’s leaders after Cárdenas were not
dismantling his reforms—though he noted they were not “pushing the social program forward,”
either.4 These hopes were markedly diminished by 1961, when Cárdenas himself lamented
Mexico’s post-1940 development strategy: “industrialization without agrarian reform is a curse
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In her biographical article on the 20th century Mexicanist Frank Tannenbaum, historian Helen Delpar
notes that after “1910 liberals and radicals in the United States had followed the tortuous course of the Mexican
Revolution closely and sympathetically, viewing it as a generally beneficent force.” See Helen Delpar, “Frank
Tannenbaum: The Making of a Mexicanist, 1914-1933,” The Americas 45, no. 2 (1988): 158,
https://www.jstor.com/stable/1006782.
2
The term “counter-reform” is credited to the prominent Mexican intellectual and public official Jesus
Silva Hertzog, Revista de Revistas, June 2, 1972, quoted in Cynthia Hewitt de Alcántara, Modernizing Mexican
Agriculture: Socioeconomic Implications of Technological Change 1940-1970 (Geneva, Switzerland: United
Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1976), 192.
3
Watt Stewart and Harold Peterson, Builders of Latin America (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1942), 292.
4
Frank Tannenbaum, Mexico: The Struggle for Peace and Bread (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1950), 7778.
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to us,” he said, also noting that “refugees from the countryside” were quickly filling the slums of
Mexico City.5
In the years following the 1940 election of Manuel Ávila Camacho to the presidency, a
joint project between the Rockefeller Foundation and the Mexican government transformed the
nation’s agriculture and rural society. Beginning in 1943, this Mexican Agricultural Program
(MAP)—as it was officially called—was the genesis of what came to be known as the Green
Revolution.6 The project’s architects hailed the Green Revolution as an example of
philanthropy’s triumph over hunger. This view, held by the same class of economic and political
leaders which underwrote the project, has for decades been at odds with the assessments of
independent observers. In other words, the academic consensus turned on the Green Revolution,7
even if its top brass remains unwavering.8 While the Rockefeller Foundation’s project did
contribute to higher crop yields in specific settings, it did so in a biased manner with resulting
social and economic costs. The Green Revolution was in effect a form of aid to already
prosperous commercial landowners for whom assistance was not a pressing necessity. The

5

Harvey O’Connor, “An Interview with General Cárdenas,” Monthly Review 13, no. 2 (June 2, 1961): 81.
The term “Green Revolution” is nearly always cited as being coined in 1968 by William Gaud,
administrator of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Alternatively, the journalisthistorian Mark Dowie argued that Ford Foundation vice president W.H. Ferry first used the term around 1959.
Regardless of who coined the term, Gaud popularized it in 1968. For a recent recitation of the standard Gaud story,
see Patrick Kilby, The Green Revolution: Narratives of Politics, Technology and Gender (New York: Routledge,
2019), 9. For the latter, see Mark Dowie, American Foundations: An Investigative History (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 2001), 112.
7
For the “academic consensus,” see, for example, Keith Griffin, The Green Revolution: An Economic
Analysis (Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1972); Harry McBeath Cleaver, Jr.,
“The Origins of the Green Revolution” (PhD diss., Stanford University, 1974); Cynthia Hewitt de Alcántara,
Modernizing Mexican Agriculture; Deborah Fitzgerald, “Exporting American Agriculture: The Rockefeller
Foundation in Mexico, 1943-53,” Social Studies of Science 16, no. 3 (1986): 457-483,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/285027; John H. Perkins, Geopolitics and the Green Revolution: Wheat, Genes, and the
Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Patrick Kilby. The Green Revolution.
8
They remained unwavering enough to launch the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) in
2006. This time around, the Rockefeller Foundation was joined by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. The core
problems of the first Green Revolution appeared to remain unaddressed. For a brief literature review on the AGRA,
see Inderjeet Parmar, Foundations of the American Century: The Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations in
the Rise of American Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 263-264.
6
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project ignored and thus marginalized the majority of Mexican farmers, for whom 1943-1965
was a period of declining living standards. These outcomes reflected the nature of the
Rockefeller Foundation and of mid-20th century American power more broadly.
Between 1943 and 1970, coverage of the Green Revolution in the American mass media
was overwhelmingly sympathetic to the project.9 For example, the American media extolled
individual figures such as the famed plant geneticist Norman Borlaug, who the Nobel Prize
website introduces as “central figure in the ‘green revolution’” (he was awarded the Peace Prize
in 1970).10 Almost seventy years after the Rockefeller Foundation’s project began, the scientist’s
obituary in the New York Times was archetypal in noting that Borlaug is often “credited with
saving hundreds of millions of lives.”11 Routine pronouncements like this can leave little doubt
in the public’s mind that Borlaug—and by extension the project itself—was nothing short of a
boon for the Mexican countryside. However, as is often the case with historical memory, the
giant-like status of certain participants can overshadow the broader nature of the events in which
they participated. This study examines the social costs of the Green Revolution, as well as the
question of who benefited from it, and how the beneficiaries’ worldview came to dominate the
public narrative. The American media portrayed the Green Revolution in Mexico as an act of
benevolence; yet, the project served the political and economic interests of the United States
while diminishing the livelihoods of rural smallholders.

9

See section V.
“Norman Borlaug - Biographical,” Peace Prize, The Nobel Prize, accessed January 27, 2022,
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1970/borlaug/biographical/.
11
Justin Gillis, “Norman Borlaug, Plant Scientist Who Fought Famine, Dies at 95,” New York Times,
September 13, 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/14/business/energy-environment/14borlaug.html.
10
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The Rockefeller Foundation launched the Green Revolution in Mexico as a representative
of the American establishment.12 It follows that media institutions representing the same values
and assumptions would lionize the Foundation’s efforts. Hence, large media corporations
celebrated the expansion of commercial agriculture in Mexico—where farming was to a
significant degree subsistence-oriented in 1943—even at the expense of that nation’s
smallholders, as a laudable victory for economic progress and humanism.13 Indeed, the American
newspaper of record, the New York Times, consistently omitted views critical of the MAP
throughout the program’s existence.14 However, it is important to distinguish between popular
perceptions deriving from the media on one hand, and the scholarly record on the other.
After 1968, when the administrator of USAID coined the term “Green Revolution,”15
specialists in a wide range of fields took aim at the project. Some even preferred to render the
term in quotations and lower case letters, as “green revolution,” and noted that it was “a loaded
term, a political slogan.”16 Indeed, Gaud explicitly conceptualized the project as an alternative to
“a violent 'red' revolution like that of the Soviets.”17 Interestingly, by giving the project a name
and triumphantly expounding its successes, its supporters simultaneously created a target for

12

The Foundation was not alone for long. The Green Revolution expanded across the Global South
beginning in 1950, after which time the roster of entities involved diversified. The Ford Foundation entered the fray
in 1959. Other major foundations joined in the 1960s; these included the Milbank Memorial and Kellogg
foundations. The US government (via USAID) also began funding aspects of the project in the 1960s. A few years
later, USAID was replaced by the World Bank. See, for example, Mark Dowie, American Foundations, 113.
13
E.g. John D. Rockefeller III, long-time trustee of the Rockefeller Foundation, outlined the “challenge” of
the 1965 Conference on Subsistence and Peasant Economics as being “not only the cold realities of economics, but
also the warm humanitarian impulses we feel toward these millions of farmers whose labors gain them hardly more
than survival.” John D. Rockefeller III, introduction to Subsistence Agriculture and Economic Development, ed.
Clifton R. Wharton, Jr. (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969), 4.
14
See Section V.
15
See footnotes 6 and 17.
16
Keith Griffin, The Political Economy of Agrarian Change: An Essay on the Green Revolution
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1974), 2.
17
“Father Of 'Green Revolution,' Renowned In Former Soviet Union, Dies At 95,” Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, September 14, 2009,
https://www.rferl.org/a/Father_Of_Green_Revolution_Dies_At_95/1822473.html.
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critics who otherwise may not have noticed the Rockefeller Foundation and its associates were
doing anything at all. Thus, by presenting the project as a gift from the gods bestowed upon the
world’s lowly peasants, the Green Revolution’s vanguard set themselves up for criticism.
The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) became a
significant hub of critical research on the Green Revolution. Founded in 1963, UNRISD focused
on studying the social effects of development initiatives. Undoubtedly responding to the
euphoric atmosphere cultivated by Gaud’s 1968 coining of “Green Revolution” and Norman
Borlaug’s 1970 Nobel Prize, UNRISD began publishing a series on the Green Revolution in the
early 1970s.18 UNRISD specialists investigated the Mexican project’s resulting economic and
social inequalities at great length.19 However, the Rockefeller Foundation’s or the United States’
interests were only discussed in passing.
Other scholars described the Foundation’s efforts to modernize agriculture in Mexico as
an attempt to curate the knowledge and expertise of local specialists in a manner amenable to
American interests. The work of the early 20th century Italian intellectual Antonio Gramsci
features prominently in these works, especially in that of Edward Berman and Inderjeet
Parmar.20 In sum, these works placed the large philanthropic foundations’ activities within
Gramsci’s framework of hegemony. However, Berman and Parmar’s works focused broadly on
the ideological connections between the big foundations and American foreign policy. Bruce
Jennings, a third scholar with a similar perspective, directly connected this framework to the

18

For basic information regarding UNRISD, see UN Research Institute for Social Development, A Brief
History of UNRISD Research (Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations, 2003), 1, 4-5.
19
See, in particular: Keith Griffin, The Green Revolution; Keith Griffin, The Political Economy of
Agrarian Change; Cynthia Hewitt de Alcántara, Modernizing Mexican Agriculture.
20
Edward H. Berman, The Influence of the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller Foundations on American
Foreign Policy: The Ideology of Philanthropy (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1983);
Inderjeet Parmar, Foundations of the American Century: The Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations in the
Rise of American Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).
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MAP.21 By focusing on the major philanthropic foundations as agents of hegemony, these
scholars bridged a gap between studies of the Green Revolution and studies of American power.
Furthermore, their extensive research in the Rockefeller Foundation Archives enriched the
present study. However, these analyses focused more on the foundations’ creation of like-minded
technocrats than on their role as representatives of American political and economic interests.
This study examines the Rockefeller Foundation’s leadership in 1943 to demonstrate some of the
interests undergirding the Green Revolution in Mexico.
The American media’s coverage of the MAP is missing from the subject’s
historiography. John Perkins mentions in the opening paragraph of his 1990 article that “much of
the popular press has lauded this ‘Green Revolution’,” but such offhand acknowledgements are
usually only a hook for an analysis otherwise unconcerned with the media.22 The present study
takes a closer look at the American media coverage of the MAP between 1943 and 1970. The
seminal text on the structure of the American mass media is Edward Herman and Noam
Chomsky’s 1988 book Manufacturing Consent. The authors argue that the major agenda setting
media’s coverage can generally be understood by examining 1) its ownership structure; 2) the
influence of advertising; 3) the need for sources from high level state and private sector
representatives; 4) the “flak” firms can expect for angering such sources; and 5) the national
leadership’s prevailing ideological framework, “anticommunism.”23 Herman and Chomsky’s
framework will serve as a general guide for Section V of this study.

21

Bruce H. Jennings, Foundations of International Agricultural Research: Science and Politics in Mexican
Agriculture (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988), 11.
22
John H. Perkins, “The Rockefeller Foundation and the Green Revolution, 1941-1956,” Agriculture and
Human Values 7 (1990): 6, https://doi-org.ezproxy.wou.edu/10.1007/BF01557305.
23
Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass
Media (New York: Pantheon, 1988), 2. The authors’ “propaganda model” is elaborated on pages 3-31, with case
studies provided in the succeeding chapters.
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Another factor that has received little emphasis in accounts regarding Mexico’s Green
Revolution is that the Rockefeller Foundation was only one entity promoting what was a broad
process of political-economic change. Beginning in 1940, Mexican elites were intent on joining
the American-led economic order.24 Whereas in South and Southeast Asia the Foundation
genuinely feared economic nationalism (“communism,” in Cold War-era vocabulary), in Mexico
the context was quite different. President Manuel Ávila Camacho (1940-1946) virtually
abandoned popular economic policies in favor of upward wealth redistribution—namely via
forced privatization of farmland and the redirection of government subsidies from smallholders
to large commercial farmers.25 After 1940, the American business and political establishment
saw that things in Mexico were going their way. In this context, the Foundation’s efforts were
only one element of a larger American policy to advance Mexico’s economic subordination.
Mexico was to be an appendage of the United States, which leading statesmen correctly assumed
would be “the inevitable economic center of the regime which will emerge” after the Second
World War.26
One final area is neglected in the existing literature: the context of Mexican history.
Harry Cleaver situated the MAP within the history of the pre-1940 efforts of “capitalist
philanthropies” to alter the agrarian societies of the American South and China,27 Stephen Niblo
placed it in the context of US-Mexican relations during WWII,28 and, finally, John Perkins
contextualized the MAP as an effort by the State Department and the White House to cultivate a

24

See Section II.
See Section II.
26
The quoted passage is from Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle’s diary, 1940. Quoted in Patrick J.
Hearden, Roosevelt Confronts Hitler: America’s Entry into World War II (Dekalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois
University Press, 1987), 244.
27
Harry McBeath Cleaver, Jr., “The Origins of the Green Revolution,” 16.
28
Stephen R. Niblo, War, Diplomacy, and Development: The United States and Mexico 1938-1954
(Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1995), 129.
25
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more conservative socioeconomic order in Mexico than had existed under Cárdenas.29 The
present study situates the MAP within Mexican agrarian history from the onset of the liberal
period in the mid-19th century to the beginning of the MAP in 1943 (Section II). From there, the
study addresses the socioeconomic effects of the project (Section III), then analyzes the political
and economic interests behind the MAP (Section IV), and finally examines the American mass
media’s coverage of the program (Section V). The common thread tying these subjects together
is their relation to the rise of modern state capitalism, and in particular to the rise of the United
States as the preeminent global power. The Rockefeller Foundation was right in the middle of
these two developments. John D. Rockefeller founded the Foundation in 1913 in the context of
Progressive-era backlash against his business interests and those of other so-called robber
barons. Other leading capitalists and statesmen followed suit. One historian described this new
type of organization as “a hybrid capitalist creation that operates tax free” and “retains many of
the characteristics of for-profit enterprises.”30 These characteristics permanently imbued the
Rockefeller Foundation with the ideology of America’s upper classes.31
II.

Prepping the Soil: Mexican Agrarian History Prior to 1943
Pre-Revolutionary Agrarian Policy, 1856-1910

The Rockefeller Foundation did not step into a vacuum when it entered Mexican agrarian
politics in 1943; changes in Mexican land tenure over the preceding century had prepped the soil
for a project like the MAP. Mexican agrarian policy in the 19th century was a major component
of the emerging liberal-conservative divide: conservatives sought to maintain the landholding

29

John H. Perkins, “The Rockefeller Foundation and the Green Revolution, 1941-1956,” 8-9.
Olivier Zunz, Philanthropy in America: A History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 4. Zunz
does note that foundation profits were to be “reinvested in the common good,” i.e. foundation projects such as the
MAP.
31
For more on the Rockefeller Foundation, see Section IV.
30
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power of the Catholic Church and of the quasi-feudal estates (haciendas), whereas liberals
sought to undermine traditional authority in favor of a new regime centered on capitalist property
relations. History favored the liberals. The Lerdo Law (Ley Lerdo) of 1856 and the Constitution
of the following year legally prohibited communal and church landholdings.32 Total
expropriation of church lands came on July 12, 1859.33 What did this mean for the majority of
Mexican farmers? Frank Tannenbaum argues that the government’s confiscation “of church
lands did not change the fundamental character of the land system,” and instead bolstered the
hacienda system.34 Furthermore, although the new laws nominally targeted both church and
communal lands, post-1856 administrations left the latter largely untouched. It was not until the
long reign of General Porfirio Díaz—the “Porfiriato” of 1876-1911—that attacks on communal
holdings began in earnest.35
The government under Díaz set out to rationalize Mexican land tenure by carving up
communal lands into individual parcels—with disastrous results for most of the rural population.
Historians Robert Buffington and William French summarize the results: “a land grab of
unprecedented proportions took place in the 1880s and 1890s. As land became a commodity to
be bought and sold, villagers […] lost them to hacendados (large landowners), speculators,” and
other elite interests.36 Foreign elites also benefited from Díaz’s economic liberalization,
purchasing significant landholdings in Mexico. By 1910, foreign owners held at least 30 percent
of Mexican land, and Americans alone owned 130 million of Mexico’s 485 million total

32

Frank Tannenbaum, The Mexican Agrarian Revolution (1929; repr., New York: Archon Books, 1968),

10-11.
33

Ibid., 9. Church buildings were exempted.
Ibid., 10.
35
Ibid., 11-12.
36
Robert M. Buffington and William E. French, “The Culture of Modernity,” in The Oxford History of
Mexico, ed. William H. Beezley and Michael C. Meyer (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 393.
34

10
acreage.37 Concentration of land into fewer hands was a hallmark of the Porfiriato. And, similar
to the confiscation of church lands in 1859, the Díaz era was a boon for the large estates. By the
outbreak of the Revolution in 1910, most rural Mexicans were landless, and just under half lived
on haciendas.38
The alienation of land under Díaz relied on the forced individualization of communal
properties. Tannenbaum notes that Díaz’s 1883 law initiating land survey expeditions “increased
the difficulty of the Indian villages by laying them open to attack through their lack of title, or by
compelling them to break up their communal holdings.” Such policies were in line, he explains,
“with a belief that the only hope of Mexico was in a destruction of the Indian communal
organization.”39 Mexico’s process of forced individualization in the countryside took place
alongside rapid industrial development in the urban centers. Industrialization policies such as
high tariffs, high railroad prices, and high taxes caused food prices to soar. Maize prices, for
example, increased by 95.6 percent between 1891 and 1908, while wages for the majority of the
population stagnated.40 Meanwhile, newly-landless peasants were driven into wage labor on the
haciendas, for which they received abysmal pay and typically fell into debt peonage.41 Susan R.
Walsh Sanderson estimates that almost half of rural Mexicans were “debt peons” when the
Revolution erupted in 1910.42
Among other ways, Mexican elites justified the dispossession of the peasantry with racial
conceptions deriving from Social Darwinism. The peasants were largely Indigenous, and thus
37
John Mason Hart, “The Mexican Revolution, 1910-1920,” in The Oxford History of Mexico, ed. William
H. Beezley and Michael C. Meyer (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 410. Hart’s figure for total foreign
ownership is just over 30 percent.
38
Robert M. Buffington and William E. French, “The Culture of Modernity,” 393.
39
Frank Tannenbaum, The Mexican Agrarian Revolution, 12-14.
40
Ibid., 149-150.
41
Ibid., 151.
42
Susan R. Walsh Sanderson, Land Reform in Mexico: 1910-1980 (Orlando, Florida: Academic Press, Inc.,
1984), 16-17.
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whites and light-skinned mestizos considered them inferior.43 For example, in 1877 a prominent
Mexican intellectual presented a painting to the Ministry of Development. The stunningly
detailed piece illustrates a broad swath of natural history: it depicts a tree with each branch
containing some biological entity, while the soil from which it springs contains a detailed
geologic history. The image exudes the raw excitement and curiosity of the modernizing period,
but it also demonstrates the era’s racial biases: the “caucasian caste” and the “white race” adorn
the very top of the artist’s tree.44 Each of these factors—the peasants’ dispossession, socially
unequal industrialization policy, resentment of foreign capital, and anti-Indigenous prejudice—
contributed significantly to the outbreak of the Mexican Revolution.
Revolution and Reform Before Cárdenas, 1910-1934
The chaotic decade-long Mexican Revolution (1910-1920) stunted the nation’s economic
growth, including agricultural production. The government responded to the war-torn economy
and to unrest amongst the peasantry with the promise of land redistribution. Article 27 of the
1917 Constitution set the stage for future agricultural policy. Article 27 declared that private
property rights were secondary to the Mexican state’s authority: “The Nation shall at all times
have the right to impose on private property such limitations as the public interest may
demand.”45 This constitutional check on unbridled economic liberalism was a major legal
reconfiguration, but it remained underutilized until the Cárdenas presidency (1934-1940).
Between 1917 and 1933, the Mexican government distributed just over 23 million acres to

43

Frank Tannenbaum, The Mexican Agrarian Revolution, 153.
“Cuadro sinóptico de Historia Natural mandado imprimir por el Ministerio de Fomento de 1877,” Siglo
XIX, Biblioteca Digital Mexicana, accessed February 14, 2022, http://bdmx.mx/documento/cuadro-sinopticohistoria-natural-1877.
45
Gerald E. Fitzgerald, ed., The Constitutions of Latin America (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company,
1968), 151.
44
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landless peasants.46 This is no small number, but it is an underwhelming figure when considering
that peasants’ demands for land reform was the leading cause of the Revolution, and that by
1923 over 58 percent of rural lands still belonged to the hacendados.47 Furthermore, 23 million
acres in sixteen years pales in comparison to Cárdenas’ record of almost 50 million acres in just
six years.
After 1917, the government slowly transferred large areas of unproductive land to more
productive communal properties (ejidos).48 The Spanish coined the term “ejido” in the colonial
period when referring to Indigenous villages. In 1934, Cárdenas created a new institution: the
collective ejido. In short, groups of peasants became eligible recipients of land expropriated from
large holdings, which they could then farm either individually or communally.49 Land
redistribution led to lower domestic food prices, higher rates of commodity consumption by
farmers, and pushed Mexico toward economic prosperity.50 At the same time, government
expropriations of large private properties spooked foreign capital. In 1969, Ford Foundation
analysts Venezian and Gamble lamented that “foreign investment has never again acquired the
importance it had before the Revolution.”51 Certainly, foreign interests had taken a hit, but, in the
early 1920s, foreigners still owned over 79 million acres of Mexican land.52

46

Susan R. Walsh Sanderson, Land Reform in Mexico, 164-165. See Appendix E.
Frank Tannenbaum, The Mexican Agrarian Revolution, 92.
48
Keith Griffin noted in 1972 that the yields on “large commercials farms” were “12 per cent lower than
yields on the ejidos.” See Keith Griffin, The Green Revolution, 79.
49
Henrik F. Infield, Cooperative Communities at Work (New York: The Dryden Press, 1945), 93.
50
George A. Collier and Elizabeth Lowery Quaratiello, Basta! Land and the Zapatista Rebellion in
Chiapas (Oakland: Food First Books, 2005), 32-33.
51
Eduardo L. Venezian and William K. Gamble, The Agricultural Development of Mexico: Its Structure
and Growth since 1950 (New York: Praeger, 1969), 16.
52
Frank Tannenbaum, The Mexican Agrarian Revolution, 512. Tannenbaum’s figure is 16,557,642
hectares (his data excludes the Federal District and the states of Morelos and Quintana Roo). Furthermore,
Americans owned over 40 million acres of the 79 million total.
47
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President Lázaro Cárdenas enacted the first articulate strategy of peasant development via
land redistribution. The pre-1934 elite followed an unpopular path of development before
ultimately selecting Cárdenas as a release valve on the population’s intensifying protestations.53
However, the Cárdenas era proved to be a more distinct break from the conservative consensus
than the ruling elite had bargained for.
The Presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas, 1934-1940
In just six years, the Cárdenas administration oversaw the distribution of over 49 million
acres to 810,000 peasants and smallholders. From 1930 to 1940, the share of rural laborers that
were landless dropped from 68 percent to 36 percent.54 Furthermore, Cárdenas’ agrarian strategy
included significant efforts to develop Mexican agriculture. Government advisors fanned out into
the countryside to assist land reform recipients with agricultural techniques, economic advice,
and with obtaining tractors and other machinery.55 Accounts sympathetic to the Green
Revolution downplayed such efforts, and instead tended to overemphasize the stasis of Mexican
agriculture prior to the 1940s. Furthermore, Cárdenas’ policies did facilitate agricultural growth:
between 1935 and 1942, the annual rate of farm production growth averaged 5.2 percent.56
Mexico could have followed this more gradual path, avoiding what one Cárdenas administration
official referred to in 1935 as the “shortcomings” and “evils of industrialism.”57 However, the
Mexican upper classes were spooked by the 1934-1940 reforms and quickly began dismantling
them after returning to power in 1940.58 Elite elements north of the border watched with relief as
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Cynthia Hewitt de Alcántara, Modernizing Mexican Agriculture, 2.
Ibid., 4. The conversion to acreage is mine. The figure given by Hewitt de Alcántara is “slightly over 20
million hectares.”
55
Sanford Mosk, Industrial Revolution in Mexico (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950), 55.
56
Cynthia Hewitt de Alcántara, Modernizing Mexican Agriculture, 12.
57
Sanford Mosk, Industrial Revolution in Mexico, 58. The Mexican official was Ramón Beteta Quintana.
58
Ibid., 6, 12.
54
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Manuel Ávila Camacho entered the National Palace—they undoubtedly agreed with his assertion
that land reform was Cárdenas’s “cardinal sin.”59 Elites north of the border welcomed this turn
from reform to counter-reform; political and economic leaders in the United States longed for a
more American-oriented Mexican regime.60 The Rockefeller Foundation was no exception. The
historian Bruce Jennings demonstrated that the Foundation was considering a Mexican
agricultural project as early as 1936, but that its postponement was “probably the result of
political events in Mexico.”61
The Ávila Camacho Presidency: Mexico’s Right Turn
President Manuel Ávila Camacho (1940-1946) and his successors aborted Mexico’s
experiment with egalitarian development.62 Ávila Camacho outlined the new strategy in a 1941
speech declaring “[t]he future of agriculture lies in the fertile lands of the coast,” announcing
plans for a “march to the sea,” and describing the necessity of organizing “a new kind of tropical
agriculture, which, because of the very nature of its production, cannot be the small-scale type.”
This strategy was necessary, Ávila Camacho goes on, to “relieve congestion in our central
plateau,” where the “traditional maize culture of the Indigenous population has continued to be
dominant.”63 The post-1940 agenda was a complete turnaround from the Cárdenas-era vision of
creating prosperous small farmers out of the very population Ávila Camacho sought to abandon
in his “march to the sea.”
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Stephen R. Niblo, War, Diplomacy, and Development, 171.
Niblo details the varying reactions within the American establishment during the Cárdenas years. See
Stephen R. Niblo, War, Diplomacy, and Development, Chapter 2.
61
Bruce H. Jennings, Foundations of International Agricultural Research, 46. Perkins, also citing the
Rockefeller Foundation Archives, dates these early rumblings back to 1933. See John H. Perkins, Geopolitics and
the Green Revolution, 106.
62
Cynthia Hewitt de Alcántara, Modernizing Mexican Agriculture, 6.
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The Second World War brought vast opportunities for Mexican foreign trade. In 1940 the
inauguration of Ávila Camacho signaled the return to power of Mexico’s industrialists, who were
not only eager to reverse the gains of the Cárdenas era, but were especially eager to take full
advantage of the war. Thus, the new governing elite quickly abandoned social reform for rapid
and careless industrialization.64 Between 1939 and 1950, the nation’s export value increased
from $156 million to $535 million, with agriculture (increasingly cash crops) expanding from 28
percent to 55 percent of all exports. As Venezian and Gamble note, at the dawn of the Green
Revolution agricultural production had already been climbing due to state investment in
irrigation and expanded land usage (i.e. expropriations and dams), though yields had gone largely
unchanged.65 However, the two Ford analysts downplayed the progress of the Cárdenas era, and
overemphasized the supposedly dangerous low yields reaped prior to the Green Revolution.
After 1940, the time was ripe to reorganize Mexican agriculture to suit the needs of
American political and economic interests. In December of that year, President Roosevelt sent
Vice President Henry A. Wallace66 to represent his administration at Manuel Ávila Camacho’s
inauguration. Reporting to Washington, Wallace informed Roosevelt that Ávila Camacho “is
fully aware of the economic and political importance of the United States to Mexico and that he
is anxious to move in our direction as fast as political necessities permit him to do so.”67
Ambassador George Messersmith echoed Wallace in 1943 when he wrote to the Secretary of
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State that Ávila Camacho’s “whole policy is firmly based in the most complete collaboration
with the United States for the present and for the future.”68
The Cárdenas administration worked to cultivate a countryside of prosperous peasants
and to ease the nation through industrialization with as little social harm as possible. The policies
carried out by the administrations following Cárdenas were at odds with these goals. They
effectively abandoned peasants and smallholders, putting the weight of the Mexican state behind
a small cohort of large commercial farmers. In this context, the Rockefeller Foundation entered
Mexican agrarian politics, becoming an integral part of the commercially-oriented development
strategy that the Ávila Camacho administration had initiated.
III.

Socioeconomic Effects of the Green Revolution

While traveling through Mexico in the mid-1950s, the prominent Canadian intellectual
George Woodcock described the Indigenous population of Mexico City as “newcomers, the
country people from the starved plateau villages who had been drawn to the city by the mirage
that promised plentiful work.” Noting the political and economic changes taking place in
Mexican society, Woodcock saw a “modernization which is only a rationalization of traditional
Europeanism, a second Conquest by technology rather than arms.”69 Some observers saw more
reason for hope than Woodcock. One of his contemporaries, the American travel writer Erna
Fergusson, believed that “Mexico has emerged from what was surely the last exploitation of her
as a backward country,” and that “[t]he power of landowners and of foreign capital has been
broken.”70 Yet, at the same time, Fergusson was not blind to the “hideous poverty” growing in
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the cities.71 Both of these travelers enunciated a piece of the truth. Modernization was, as
Woodcock argued, essentially an economic conquest of the countryside. And, as Fergusson
observed, Mexico had risen above the status of colony—however, this was only barely the case.
Certainly, Mexico would never see, as other Latin American nations did, the violent destruction
of its polity by an American-backed military coup or by outright invasion, yet it would still
remain subordinate to the United States. The historian Stephen Niblo argued that after World
War II American aid, Truman’s Point Four program, the Export-Import Bank, the World Bank,
and the International Monetary Fund collectively constituted “a more powerful force than
landing the Marines.”72 Though its role was decidedly smaller than that of those organizations,
the Rockefeller Foundation’s Mexican Agricultural Program was part of the same “force,” i.e.
American influence over Mexico.
That Mexico’s Green Revolution produced socially unequal results is clear to all
observers. However, those outside of the Foundation’s nexus and sources close to the Foundation
differ in the extent to which they emphasize this biased outcome. In 1960, for example, the
Rockefeller Foundation’s annual report noted that “[t]he growing commercialization of Mexican
agriculture” was creating “new problems” for farmers, requiring them to adopt “greater
efficiency” to maintain solvency.73 In 1967, the authorized history of the project bluntly
conceded that “the great majority of Mexico’s small farmers have not yet gained much from
agricultural research,” and that “the increased wealth produced by the improvement of
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agriculture in the past 20 years has gone largely to the upper income groups.”74 However, these
results are chalked up to natural market forces: using American small farmers’ experiences as an
analogy, the authors note that “either they have become better farmers…or they have given up
farming and moved to the city.”75 Furthermore, these modest self-reflections do not mirror the
general thrust of the book. The authors spend the lion’s share of their 300-page chronicle
praising the project with statements of the following character: “[i]n 1941 [Mexican] agriculture
was traditional; now it is progressive,” and “[t]he Rockefeller Foundation was called, and it was
chosen.”76 Regarding this second declaration, the historian Bruce Jennings’ research in the
Rockefeller Foundation archives presents a somewhat different picture. According to a 1950
communication authored by the Foundation’s Director for the Natural Sciences, the Mexican
Agricultural Program “was initially more or less stuffed down their throats.”77 This comment
was likely referring to disagreements between the Foundation-run MAP and its Mexican-run
counterpart, the Institute of Agricultural Investigation. The latter was insistent on a more
peasant-oriented approach, and thus failed to achieve the support of the Mexican government,
which instead turned to the Foundation.78 Ultimately, whether the Rockefeller Foundation
received a lofty calling or whether it stuffed the Green Revolution down Mexico’s throat is
neither here nor there. What is important is that even the Rockefeller Foundation’s
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commissioned history concludes that Mexico’s Green Revolution benefited large commercial
farmers instead of the majority of small holders.
The most comprehensive assessment of the socioeconomic effects of Mexico’s Green
Revolution continues to be Cynthia Hewitt de Alcántara’s Modernizing Mexican Agriculture,
published as part of the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development’s series on the
Green Revolution. Her study illustrates that to understand the MAP’s effects, it is important to
look beyond simple metrics, such as agricultural yields or the GDP, and instead assess a broader
range of evidence. For example, she argues that “the strategy of rural modernization” in an
Indigenous village in Sonora state was “enforced” in a way that “seriously damaged a
remarkable tradition of economic and social democracy, self-government, and community
service.”79 One of the more tragic—yet statistically immeasurable—factors she notes is the
demoralization of Mexico’s peasants, who were ultimately “forced to grow accustomed to
passivity” in the face of a new regime which cast them aside after 1940.80 Other metrics were
more readily observable. By 1960, real wages stagnated or fell for landless laborers, and 83
percent of Mexican farmers existed, in her words, “at a subsistence or below subsistence level.”81
Furthermore, by comparing figures from Mexico’s central bank with the Food and Agriculture
Organization’s nutritional guidelines, she observed that in “1969-1970 an estimated one third of
the population…probably suffered the effects of protein-calorie malnutrition.”82 Another
measurable development is that Mexico experienced an exodus from the countryside to its urban
centers. In 1940, just over a third of Mexicans lived in cities—by 1960 the figure was over 50
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percent.83 And, whereas the authors of Campaigns Against Hunger argued that Mexican farmers,
like American farmers before them, would either become successful commercial farmers or
move to the cities for employment, there was a key difference in Mexico. Mexican cities did not
possess the industrial sector of the 19th-20th century United States, leaving George Woodcock’s
“newcomers” with no prospects for advancement.84 In Hewitt de Alcántara’s final analysis, the
Green Revolution was “not development.”85 This was an industrialization with no light at the end
of the tunnel.
Incidentally, the MAP coincided with the so-called Mexican Miracle (1940-1970), during
which annual GDP growth remained high. In these three decades, Mexico’s industrial and and
financial sectors grew, prices remained stable, and upward mobility became a reality for a small
portion of the population. For these fortunate urbanites, standards of living increased. However,
the benefits of the Mexican Miracle did not extend to the rural majority—or even the urban
majority.86
Intellectuals associated with the major foundations had their own ideas about the root
causes of rural poverty in Mexico. Everett M. Rogers, for example, compiled a list titled “Ten
Elements in the Subculture of Peasantry” for a 1969 volume on subsistence agriculture which
grew out of a 1965 conference sponsored jointly by a Rockefeller Brothers Fund project and the
congressionally-established East-West Center.87 Longtime Foundation trustee John D.
Rockefeller III wrote the book’s introduction, and future Foundation president Clifton R.
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Wharton, Jr. served as its editor. Rogers’ list of peasant characteristics includes a supposed “lack
of innovativeness,” “fatalism,” “low aspirational levels,” “a lack of empathy,” and a “limited
time perspective.”88 Most of these alleged characteristics can be dismissed as outdated
paternalism or ethnocentrism (for example, peasants’ “low levels of aspiration” are explained by
their lack of “Anglo-Saxon virtues of hard work”).89 However, there is a kernel of truth to some
of Rogers’ characteristics, such as the issue of “time perspective.” Even the more culturally
astute George Woodcock opined in 1944 that for the “Mexican peon of today, time is represented
by the cyclic processes of nature, the alternation of day and night, the passage from season to
season.”90 While Rogers was concerned with the peasantry’s “time perspective” as a roadblock
for developing large-scale commercial agriculture, peasants themselves were more likely to
experience this cultural divide in highly relatable ways. For example, one informant in Oscar
Lewis’ 1964 oral history of a Mexican peasant family described the strain of meeting monthly
rent payments after her relocation to Mexico City: “[i]n Azteca [her village], everything is
different. Sometimes we don't even know what month it is.”91 Rogers was quite familiar with
Lewis’ work, which appears heavily in his footnotes, but his article and its parent volume deal
with peasants as a problem to be solved, rather than as communities to be understood or to be
included in a development strategy. Ultimately it is Woodcock’s criticism of authors like Rogers
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which has stood the test of time: “they become the servants of the concept of time which they
themselves have made, and are held in fear, like Frankenstein by his own monster.”92
In a study published the same year (1969), two Ford Foundation analysts argued that
peasant society “must necessarily disappear in the long run if Mexican agriculture is to be fully
modernized and rural misery is to be eliminated.”93 The relation between Mexico’s deliberately
unequal strategy of modernization and “rural misery” is not discussed in the Ford-sponsored
study. Forty years earlier Frank Tannenbaum described the “destruction of the Indian communal
organization” as a key objective during Mexico’s initial attempts to alienate peasant landholdings
in the 19th century. These attempts exacerbated “rural misery” and ultimately led to the Mexican
Revolution. While the Revolution did not destroy the peasantry, it did spell the beginning of the
end for the haciendas, thus removing one roadblock from the onward march of liberal
modernization. After all, the 18th century political economist Adam Smith warned not only
laborers but also landed gentlemen that “those who live by profit” should be met “with the most
suspicious attention,” because their prerogative “is never exactly the same with that of the
public,” rather, this class has “an interest to deceive and even oppress the public.”94 Once
Cárdenas broke the power of the hacendados in the last gasp of the Mexican Revolution, the
peasants remained the final roadblock to capitalist modernization.95
IV.
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As a philanthropic institution, the Rockefeller Foundation should by definition only be
concerned with bettering some aspect of human society. However, two structural constraints
mitigated this outcome. First, the Foundation derived its funding from the economic leadership
of the nation, and its finances were thoroughly enmeshed in the American economy.96 Second,
the men in charge of the Rockefeller Foundation came from high positions within the American
state and private sectors; to reach such positions, they had to hold certain beliefs—nearly by
definition.97 Their efforts in Mexico expanded investment opportunities and curated a political
environment more conducive to American state interests. Furthermore, the Green Revolution
was not limited to Mexico; the MAP was only a jumping-off point for a wider program of
international agricultural change in Latin America and beyond. In the 1950s and 1960s, the
Foundation engineered and introduced new strains of rice in parts of Asia, where American
leaders feared countries would adopt some form of economic self-determination, as China had in
1949—with parts of Southeast Asia on their way.98 In short, foundations and their allies often
discussed their activities as if they were endeavors free of any motive other than benevolent aid,
but the reality was quite different. The Rockefeller Foundation should be seen as part of the
wider state-private nexus in which it was embedded. As Waldemar Nielsen wrote in his major
1972 study The Big Foundations,
Foundation annual reports habitually observe a discreet silence on the continuing
relationship between philanthropy and the wealth from which it springs; it is as if
foundations were created by some process resembling Immaculate Conception,
96
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and that once born their purity remains unstained by contact with the sordid world
of private economic interest. Such, of course, is hardly the case.99
Spelling it out further, Nielsen argued that “foundation boards are a microcosm of what
has been variously called the Establishment, the power elite, or the American ruling
class.”100 (Such statements are all the more significant considering their author—
Nielsen—was ultimately sympathetic to the big foundations). All told, when
representatives of the establishment form and command institutions, it stands to reason
that those institutions will then act in the shared interests of the same cohort.
The following examination of the Rockefeller Foundation’s leadership at the beginning
of the Mexican Agricultural Program in 1943 affirms this reasoning. The men who set the
agenda for the Rockefeller Foundation at that time came from high level positions within
American political, economic, and cultural institutions. Examining the board of trustees’
affiliations with these sectors of American leadership reveals the interests undergirding the
project. This analysis sketches a collective image of the Rockefeller Foundation’s leadership to
gain a better idea of what kind of activities one could reasonably expect the Foundation to
undertake.
The Rockefeller Foundation leadership consisted of nineteen trustees when it launched
the Mexican Agricultural Program in 1943. When surveying the careers of these nineteen men,
the following image appears: seventeen attended either Harvard, Princeton, Yale, Columbia,
Cornell, MIT, John Hopkins, or the University of Chicago,101 and eight went on to hold
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leadership positions at the University of California, the University of Chicago, Columbia Law
School, Cornell, McGill University, and Princeton. The board of trustees drew heavily from the
private sector: twelve held high level positions at major private firms, such as presidentships at
Chase National Bank, New Jersey Bell, Mutual Insurance of New York, AT&T, and other
corporations; directorships at General Motors, Empire Trust Company, Western Bancorporation,
First National Bank of New York, US Steel Corporation, among others. For several trustees,
deciding which economic affiliations to include is almost arbitrary. Thomas I. Parkinson’s
obituary simply notes, for example, that he was “director or trustee of many corporations.”102
Others, like John Foster Dulles and John D. Rockefeller III, hardly require an introduction.
Dulles, however, provides a clear link between private and state affiliations; his
trusteeship ended in 1952, just prior to his tenure as Secretary of State, where he “dominated
both the making and the conduct of United States foreign policy,” as noted in his incredibly
extensive obituary.103 Several months after President Eisenhower appointed Dulles as Secretary
of State in January of 1953, the State Department produced a confidential memorandum to
prepare Eisenhower for a meeting with Mexican President Adolfo Ruiz Cortines. The memo
assured Eisenhower that US relations with Mexico were “stable and friendly” in spite of
Mexico’s “vague suspicion of our motives” and its annoyance with the fact “that we may
mistake domestic reforms among our neighbors for Communism.” Minor quibbles aside, Dulles’
State Department happily explained that the “only effective political party in Mexico today is
essentially capitalistic and orthodox in outlook.” The State Department was perturbed by
102
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Mexico’s “reluctance to export unprocessed raw materials” to the United States notwithstanding
the latter’s attempts at persuasion, but it was felt that eventually this “reluctance” could be
overcome. This attitude toward Mexico was in line with the logic of the MAP—Mexico’s
obstinate posturing toward “improving the economic condition of the rural masses through land
reform” was seen as an unfortunate defect.104
In total, seventeen out of nineteen trustees served in some notable capacity within the
United States government.105 These posts ranged from Secretary of State to Ambassador to
Britain, from the Research and Development Board of the National Military Establishment to a
Deputy War Shipping Administrator, and from the Federal Reserve to a Surgeon General.106
These were individuals with, in Inderjeet Parmar’s words, a “firm, indeed unshakable,
attachment to American global leadership.”107 Mass media reports reflected this overlap, and
often blurred the line between state and private goals. The Great Falls Tribune, for example, ran
an article about the MAP in 1950 titled “Example of a ‘Point 4’ Program,”108 referring to
President Truman’s Cold War-era development plan.
The prevalence of elite-educated trustees and the Foundation’s inclusion of eight leading
men within academia lends itself to the “knowledge curation” thesis of Berman, Jennings, and
Parmer, and the likelihood of trustees having served in the federal government falls in line with
Niblo and Perkins’ emphasis on importance of American state interests. Furthermore, while the
high frequency of economic affiliations and the nature of the MAP correspond with Cleaver’s
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capitalist expansion thesis, there are also more direct indications that the MAP and the
Foundation’s trustees acted in concert with the interests of American agribusiness.
One example of Foundation-agribusiness overlap is the relationship between Chase
National Bank and Cargill, Inc. The two giants became intertwined in 1933, when Chase and the
grain trading firm Cargill initiated a special relationship. Chase was not only a Rockefeller
family possession,109 but Winthrop W. Aldrich, a Foundation trustee between 1935 and 1951 and
an uncle to the Rockefeller brothers, served as president of the bank from 1930 to 1953.110
Cargill is often described as “the nation’s largest privately held company.”111 Indeed, Cargill was
(and is) a giant in agribusiness. For the crop year 1942-1943 (i.e. at the onset of the MAP),
Cargill netted over $2 million, and had a net worth of over $13.6 million.112 Thus, Cargill is of
some relevance to the Green Revolution, which was ultimately an effort to standardize the
Mexican grain trade. As Wayne Broehl explains in his history of Cargill, the agreement between
Chase and Cargill grew out of the latter’s need for credit in the financial tumult of the early
1930s. In short, a consortium of banks led by Chase supplied Cargill with an open line of credit
in return for fiscal constraints and special fees. Leaders from each firm referred to the resulting
relationship as the “Chase Syndicate.”113 Furthermore, Chase was no idle business partner of
Cargill. Some Cargill executives even chafed under Chase’s short leash from the outset.114 Nor
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was the relationship short-lived: well into the 1960s, when the firm began operations in Mexico,
Broehl describes Chase as Cargill’s “lead bank.”115
In Broehl’s estimation, the Green Revolution’s “effects on the international grain trade
were pronounced.”116 Furthermore, the work of MAP scientists was clearly of importance to
Cargill, for Broehl explains that in the mid-1970s Cargill’s own plant geneticists began “building
on some of the earlier research done by Norman Borlaug…in Mexico,” contributing to the
company’s “modestly profitable” hybrid seed sales, which ranged from $300,000 to $526,000 in
the late 1960s.117 Finally, Broehl describes a relevant episode in which Cargill serviced an order
by the Iraqi government for 63,000 tons of wheat seed—worth “close to $2 million.” Iraq was
reeling from a series of droughts in 1969-1970, and “wanted to placate the peasants by ordering
expensive high-yielding ‘miracle’ wheat from Mexico.” However, Iraq demanded the seed “be
treated with a methyl-mercury fungicide,” a poisonous treatment banned in the United States.
Facilitating the sale via Mexico, Cargill’s order shipped out from Sonora adorned with skulls and
crossbones, and soon reached the starving population in Iraq. By early 1972, Broehl notes, the
number of Iraqis with mercury poisoning “was a national epidemic.” He ends this horrifying tale
by quoting a company report which explains with relief that “[n]o blame has been attached to
us,” and Broehl himself remarks that this episode, in which Cargill sold inedible wheat to a
starving nation, “was an unsettling experience for the Company to endure.”118
Lewis W. Douglas serves as another example of Foundation-agribusiness crossover. A
Foundation trustee between 1935 and 1960, Douglas served as a vice president and director of
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American Cyanamid Company, a major fertilizer manufacturer, between 1934 and 1937.119
Though Douglas’ position within the firm was short-lived, his stake in its success did not end
there: in the mid-1930s he obtained $100,000 from his father to purchase 3,000 shares of
company stock.120 American Cyanamid began as a producer of nitrogen for chemical fertilizers
in 1907, later diversifying to produce pesticides, as well as a wide range of non-agricultural
products.121 In 1941, the firm netted $6.7 million, with $62.5 million in assets.122 Stephen Niblo
details an interesting event concerning American Cyanamid, Chase National Bank, and Mexico.
After the outbreak of WWII, the Mexican government confiscated and transferred the German
firm I.G. Farben’s chemical interests to the US Office of Alien Property Custodian. Prior to its
confiscation, I.G. Farben’s holdings in Mexico amounted to “some 95 percent of the basic
chemical industry,” Niblo explains. After I.G. Farben’s ouster, American Cyanamid’s president
Colonel Pope and Joseph C. Rovensky met to discuss Cyanamid’s takeover of Mexico’s
chemical industry. At the time of the meeting, Rovensky was working in the Office of InterAmerican Affairs under Nelson Rockefeller and “was on loan to the government” from Chase
National Bank. The same year, an American journalist broke the story, and ultimately the
monopoly plot failed.123 Nonetheless, the Green Revolution in Mexico did wonders for the
American chemical industry. According to the Inter-American Development Bank, Mexico’s
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consumption of fertilizers grew from 3,500 tons to 690,000 tons between 1950 and 1972, with
corn, wheat, and sugar accounting for around 85 percent of total usage.124
Neither of these two men, Winthrop W. Aldrich and Lewis W. Douglas, can be reduced
to their affiliations with American agribusiness. Economically speaking, Aldrich’s connections
to the broader world of finance were far more important, and in any case, Chase National’s
relationship with Cargill was not a defining characteristic of the bank. Neither can Douglas be
reduced to his role as the head of American Cyanamid. He came from an immensely wealthy
mining family—best known for the forced removal of 1,200 striking miners from Bisbee,
Arizona in 1917125—and held numerous leadership positions in academia, finance and industry.
In the end, Douglas’ obituary notes, “his business was banking.”126 Furthermore, both men held
prominent positions within the American government. For example, the two separately served as
Ambassadors to England, “a post so costly it can be accepted only by the wealthiest men,”
according to Aldrich’s obituary.127 A day in the life for Lewis in 1940 consisted of corresponding
with the president of Harvard, with both men agreeing “that the United States must become the
dominant power” after the Second World War.128 In sum, while each man stood to benefit
economically from the Mexican Agricultural Program, it is more important to observe that they
likely could not have imagined supporting a program like that of the Cárdenas administration,
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which sought to develop Mexican agriculture via the collective ejido system. Their positions in
American society would have made such a thought highly unlikely.
Other connections between Foundation trustees and American agribusiness are not hard
to find. Karl T. Compton served as a director at the General Foods Corporation, William I.
Myers was a director at the Continental Can Company, Thomas Parran was the brother of a
prominent “agriculturalist and cattle breeder” (to quote the New York Times),129 and Harold H.
Swift headed the meat packing firm Swift & Co.130 Furthermore, the class composition of the
Foundation’s leadership changed little over the MAP’s lifetime, as G. William Domhoff’s 1967
study demonstrates.131 It is also illuminating to examine the broader proliferation of American
agribusiness activity in Mexico following the introduction of the MAP. The Appendix of a 1980
study, Agribusiness in the Americas, illustrates this trend clearly.132 The authors assembled data
on “the investments of the sixty largest U.S. agribusiness corporations in Latin America” up to
1980.133 Between 1943 and 1980, 48 American agribusiness firms began operations in Mexico,
44 of which engaged in activities which were related to the MAP’s various efforts. One
corporation missing from their Appendix is Cargill, which “began to commercialize grains in
Mexico” in 1965, and “quickly managed to position itself as one of the main suppliers of the
country’s biggest food producers,” according to the firm’s website.134 As noted in Section III,
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these developments coincided with a precipitous decline in living standards for much of the
Mexican population.
The architects of Mexico’s Green Revolution were acutely aware of the need to sell these
developments to the public—both Mexican and American. As Stakman et al. note in their
authorized history of the Mexican Agricultural Program, in the event of a public demonstration
of the Foundation’s work, “[t]he press naturally was on hand.” The Mexican media’s
attentiveness owed primarily to the class composition of the Mexican recipients of technical
assistance, and the three scientists provided one specific example of this in Campaigns Against
Hunger. In 1948, one commercial farmer from Sonora visited an editor of the Mexican daily El
Universal and raved about the MAP, securing positive coverage in that newspaper. El Universal
being one of Mexico’s papers of record, dozens of local dailies followed suit in praising the
program.135 In this instance, the Foundation-backed farmer had a special relationship with the
editor: it was his nephew. However, what is most important here is not this particular familial
connection, but rather the basic reality of class privilege. The Mexican press, like the American
media, reflected the basic political-economic worldview of its national establishment.
Incidentally, a connection of a similar nature—a Rockefeller Foundation trustee who also
happened to publish the New York Times—existed on the American side, and was equally
insignificant for the same reason.136 The social standing of commercial farmers explains their
amiable relations with the Foundation and the Mexican media. Peasants were far removed from
this privileged network and thus could not count on the agenda setting media firms to rally
behind their cause. In the United States, the same was true for experts who doubted the methods
of the MAP.
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Like the agricultural scientists who authored Campaigns Against Hunger, the mainstream
of development studies understood the need to convince the general population that projects like
the MAP were in their best interest. Looking again to Everett Rogers’ 1969 article, he argued
that one remedy for peasants’ so-called “localiteness,” as opposed to the “[c]osmopoliteness…of
urbanites and commercial farmers,” included mass media outreach which was “‘propagandistic
in nature, designed to inform or persuade people about various kinds of modernization.’”137 A
survey of American media coverage of Mexico’s Green Revolution shows that the proposal to
propagandize peasant societies was in effect a call to extend domestic media practices abroad.
The American media covered the Green Revolution in near-complete harmony with the political
and economic worldview of domestic and Mexican elites. This fact was made clear in the New
York Times’ coverage of the program.
V.

Media Coverage of the Green Revolution, 1943-1970

For the duration of the Green Revolution in Mexico, the New York Times’ (hereafter NYT
or Times) coverage was consistently sympathetic to the Rockefeller Foundation’s efforts.
Furthermore, even though reports specifically related to the MAP were scarce during its early
years, the NYT’s reporting on Mexican agrarian issues was nonetheless perfectly in line with the
Foundation’s perspective. This coverage was a continuation of the media’s chief perennial
functions: to generate profit and to inform its audiences within the ideological bounds of the
prevailing socioeconomic system.138 The former requires little comment, but, for reference, the
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Times netted over $5.1 million in 1965.139 However, the second role does warrant some
explanation. On occasion, the national media acts in such blatant unison that it can be difficult to
call it anything other than propaganda. For example, when President Cárdenas nationalized
American oil interests in 1938, the national media’s coverage amounted to what has been called
“a propaganda campaign against the Mexican government.”140 However, such events are outliers
in an otherwise more nuanced media environment. But, broadly speaking, the dominant media
companies do operate within the constraints of the American political and economic system.
Certain assumptions are rarely questioned, such as the belief in the benevolent role of the United
States and its allies in world affairs. By extension, the benevolence of non-state entities which
act in concord with the interests of the American system is assumed, as are their activities. As the
following pages attest, the Rockefeller Foundation’s Mexican Agricultural Program certainly fell
within this framework.
1940s
It was commonplace in the first decade of the MAP for American media reports to mirror
the public positions of politicians north and south of the border. A 1946 report in the NYT titled
“Mexico Aims to End One-Crop Economy” echoed President Ávila Camacho’s earlier call for a
“march to the sea” to rescue Mexico from Indigenous maize culture. President Alemán (19461952), the article explains, sought “not only” to modernize Mexican agriculture, “but also to
endeavor to break the corn tradition.” The Times chastises the peasantry for perpetuating “the
legend that the country is a horn of plenty” with an adequate supply of “good, rich land, if only
they could acquire it.” “While some progress already has been made” toward breaking the
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peasantry, “the Mexican farmer still usually believes that his family’s sustenance, as well as his
independence, rests on that one crop.” It was for these reasons, the NYT informed its readers, that
Mexican diets were inadequate.141 Missing from this report are two key factors. First, the
peasants’ belief that good land was available was likely informed by the fact that between 1934
and 1942 the Mexican government distributed between 3.7 and 10.3 million acres annually to the
peasantry. Even the year before the publication of the article, the government distributed over 1.6
million acres.142 Thus, the peasants’ idea that land was available was no “legend.” Second, the
article’s lack of historical context evokes an image of an unchanging Mexico, perpetually held
back by the reactionary ways of the peasantry. As noted above, this contention is untrue—
Cárdenas’ coupled his efforts to modernize agriculture with social reform.
The following year, the Times reported a visit by a Mexican delegation to the United
States. The delegation was led by President Alemán’s former “schoolmate,” Senator Gabriel
Ramos Millan. This delegation had three purposes: to discuss the MAP with Rockefeller
Foundation representatives, to purchase farm machinery, and to tour the Tennessee Valley
Authority. Again, the NYT informed its readers within the MAP’s logic of “mechanizing corn
production in areas best suited for it,” with no mention of the fact that most Mexican farmers did
not live in such areas. Similarly, Millan expounded Mexico’s “hopes” for the proliferation of
MAP seeds and the “extermination” of traditional crop varieties “within two years.” Whether or
not this view actually reflected Mexican public opinion is left unconsidered.143 In fact, Millan’s
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uncritically reproduced statements presented only one side of the story; the Mexican
government’s own Institute for Agricultural Investigation advocated a smallholder-based
modernization strategy, including the development of seeds more suitable for peasant
agriculture.144
1950s
The NYT’s first extensive article on the MAP appeared in 1950, when the NYT Magazine
ran a piece authored by George W. Gray of the Rockefeller Foundation. The article’s praise
begins with the title (“Blueprint for Hungry Nations”) and only picks up steam from there. Gray
describes the village of Juchitepec—a recipient of MAP corn seeds—as having “celebrated many
fiestas in its history, but never one like this—a fiesta honoring Norteamericanos.” Gray does
quietly note that “Juchitepec is only a tiny part of Mexico,” but he quickly brushes past this sober
aside and regales the reader with an account of the MAP’s spectacular achievements. Gray also
provides a brief account of the MAP’s genesis, noting the Mexican Ministry of Agriculture’s
“keen enthusiasm” at the start of the project.145 The timing here is interesting. Several months
after Gray’s article appeared, the head of the Foundation’s Natural Sciences division made his
(previously cited) comment to the foundation’s president that the program was “stuffed down
their throats,” and he also noted the customary yet “very misleading” notion that the Mexican
government had understood what it was agreeing to. Such a discrepancy of the basic facts would
be detectable to investigative journalists at what was arguably the most important newspaper in
the world, but because the Times and the Rockefeller Foundation were embedded in the same
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community and reflected the same general interests, some questions went unasked because they
were likely never considered. Later the same year, the Times ran another article detailing the
MAP’s work, this time uncredited—thus presumably not authored by a Rockefeller Foundation
employee. Surprisingly, the tone was more exuberant than the company man’s: “Mexico’s food
cupboard will soon be the envy of Old Mother Hubbard,” it begins, moving on to extoll the new
crop varieties (especially corn, which, as discussed previously, was far less successful than
wheat), the Mexican government’s enthusiasm, and finally, the impressive-sounding sums of
money expended on the program.146
Two years later, in 1952, the Times reported that the MAP was set to expand its successes
in crop science to livestock. The article touched on the higher yields of MAP hybrids and the
spreading of those seeds to far-flung Israel and India. Then, with a premature sense of finality,
the Times declared that “[w]hat Mexico needed was more high quality food produced with less
labor,” due to the fact that “labor was being drained off the land for new factories and public
works projects.” Citing a Rockefeller Foundation report, the NYT noted that “the timing of the
program could scarcely have been more propitious,” thus leaving the reader with a sense of
historical harmony: the Foundation stepped in just at the right time, when the Mexican peasantry
was “being drained off the land.”147 The Times omits the alternate perspective—that the previous
twelve years of commercialization strategy was a major contributor to this draining, and that the
Cárdenas administration had sought to shore up peasant communities rather than destroy them.
1960s
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One of the more notable aspects of the Times’ coverage discussed thus far is the causal
power it has awarded the Rockefeller Foundation; in each of these articles, the advances in
Mexican agriculture were almost entirely attributed to the MAP. An article appearing in early
1961 seemed to break this mold. The centerpiece of the article is “the rehabilitation of the old
Pacific Railway” along Mexico’s west coast, which “helped to awaken Mexico from an
economic siesta.” However, other advances listed include irrigation, dams, electrification, and
mosquito eradication. Most relevantly, though, is the enormous growth of agricultural yields due
to the expansion of cultivable land—a key factor often ignored in reports crediting the MAP for
Mexico’s increased crop yields. As the article demonstrates, the Rockefeller Foundation was
only one of many foreign entities engaged with Mexican agriculture and development.
Furthermore, it indicates that the World Bank and various United Nations organizations were far
more engaged than the Foundation.148 However, this discrepancy does not appear in the article,
nor in other articles relating to the MAP.
By the late 1960s, American newspapers were extolling the commercialization of
Mexican agriculture. In 1968, The Arizona Republic ran an article titled “Mexico Becoming a
‘World Trader’,” noting that “Mexican agriculture is earning its rightful place among the
commercial food trade nations” thanks to “the Mexican Agricultural Program, the oldest of the
Rockefeller Foundation’s efforts.”149
The Green Revolution and Media in the Digital Era
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In spite of technological changes, the structural nature of media coverage has changed
little in the digital age. An example of this continuity is an article titled “History and Overview
of the Green Revolution,” published by the website ThoughtCo.150 ThoughtCo publishes simple,
concise articles on a wide variety of subjects, which frequently appear at the top of results on
search engines such as Google. ThoughtCo is a subsidiary of Dotdash Meredith, which the NYT
recently described as a “digital-age magazine giant.” The goal of Dotdash Meredith and its
subsidiaries, according to an executive just prior to the outfit’s $2.7 billion merger in late 2021,
is to “offer uniquely engaged audiences to advertisers and partners.”151 In other words, the firm’s
chief objective is identical to all mass media corporations: to sell viewers to advertisers.
With this institutional sketch in mind, ThoughtCo’s depiction of the Green Revolution
should not be surprising. Overall, the article presents a positive image of the Green Revolution,
but it does contain a brief section titled “Criticism of the Green Revolution,” which admits that
there have been “several criticisms” of the project. However, the author proceeds to name only
two, and they are hardly criticisms at all. The first is essentially a claim that the Green
Revolution has been too successful: by allegedly creating such abundance, it “has led to
overpopulation.” On the contrary, a recent study concluded that the Green Revolution had a
“negative effect” on population growth in the developing world.152 But even if is assumed that
the project boosted population growth, three prominent food security specialists have noted
finding “no direct correlation between population density and hunger” anywhere in the world.153
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The second criticism, somewhat paradoxically, is that the benevolent wings of the project
did not spread wide enough: Africa was left out. Embedded in this criticism is the dubious
assumption that the Green Revolution produced desirable results and thus would have benefited
Africa. However, this criticism is interesting for another reason. It fails to mention that the
Rockefeller and Bill & Melinda Gates foundations did in fact launch an initiative called the
Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa in 2006. Therefore, ThoughtCo readers concerned by
this second “criticism” will be relieved to discover that the professional descendants of the first
Green Revolution are at work in Africa. The major problems with the first Green Revolution—
social inequality and economic subordination—are not raised.
VI.

Conclusion

Political and economic forces radically changed the Mexican countryside in the century
leading up to the Green Revolution. First, the government revoked the landholding privileges of
the Catholic Church, and then the Mexican Revolution (eventually, after 1934) crushed the
power of the hacendado class. By 1943, the Mexican government had aborted the egalitarian
efforts of Cárdenas and only the peasantry—the great majority of the rural population—stood in
the way of individualizing land tenure. In this context, the Rockefeller Foundation’s Mexican
Agricultural Program was just one further step in the direction of capitalist modernization.
Furthermore, Mexico was not to develop in the style of the United States or Britain; Mexico
lacked the industrial base and protectionist policies which facilitated the industrialization of
those 19th and 20th century Atlantic empires.
The Green Revolution provided large commercial farms with technological aid which
boosted their already impressive yields. These farmers grew crops for market and had more in
common with businessmen than peasants or smallholders. Their ability to grow large quantities
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of uniform crops, to purchase expensive inputs such as agrochemicals, machinery and hybrid
seeds made them attractive to the leadership of the Rockefeller Foundation. For Mexico's
farming elite, the Mexican Agricultural Program was a welcome endeavor. For the rest of the
population, it was another in a long line of upward wealth redistributions. Rural poverty climbed,
urbanization accelerated, and hunger persisted.
American economic and political interests benefited from the Green Revolution. The
MAP fit within the context of US-Mexican cooperation during World War II, and continued to
facilitate a US-oriented Mexican political economy throughout the Cold War. Sales of
agricultural machinery, agrochemicals, and hybrid seeds all grew precipitously after the 1940s.
And, where the physical economy goes, finance always follows; capital investments require
loans, and loans charge interest. The men in charge of the Rockefeller Foundation were
thoroughly enmeshed in the American economic, cultural and political establishment, and were
likely incapable of seeing any alternative to programs carried out in the political and economic
interest of the United States.
The agenda setting mass media firms in the United States were, like the leadership of the
Rockefeller Foundation, inseparable from the American establishment. Between 1943 and 1970
this was certainly true of the nation’s newspaper of record, the New York Times. Constrained by
the need to please advertisers and elite sources, and biased by the prevailing dogmas of the era,
firms such as the New York Times consistently covered the Mexican Agricultural Program in a
positive light. With those factors in mind, this would likely have been true even if the
newspaper’s publisher had not been a trustee at the Foundation. The media’s coverage of the
MAP demonstrates the cohesion of those at the top of a political and economic system
characterized by concentrated power and wealth. While the major media outlets portrayed the
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Green Revolution in Mexico as an example of progress and development, the project in fact
benefited small elite sectors of the American and Mexican populations at the expense of the
latter’s vast majority.
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Appendix
Rockefeller Foundation Trustees, 1943154
Name (years as a Rockefeller Foundation trustee; other Foundation position[s]): private
economic affiliation(s); academic affiliation(s); government affiliation(s).
Winthrop W. Aldrich (1935-1951): President, Chase National Bank; Lawyer for Standard Oil
(Indiana); Harvard; Harvard Law; U.S. Ambassador to the U.K.
Chester I. Barnard (1940-1952; President, 1948-1952): President, New Jersey Bell; Harvard;
President of United Service Organizations; Special Assistant to the Secretary of Treasury.
Karl T. Compton (1940-1953): Director, General Motors; Trustee, American Optical Company;
Director, General Foods Corporation; Princeton; President, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology; board of trustees, Princeton; Chairman, Research and Development Board of the
National Military Establishment.
Harold W. Dodds (1937-1954): Princeton; President, Princeton; advisor, Nicaraguan
government; advisor, General John J. Pershing; various appointments under presidents Truman,
Eisenhower.
Lewis W. Douglas (1935-1960): Douglas mining family; Vice President, American Cyanamid
Company; President, Mutual Insurance of New York; Director, Empire Trust Company;
Director, General Motors; Director, International Nickel; Director, Western Bancorporation;
Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Principle and Vice Chancellor, McGill University; U.S.
House of Representatives; New Deal-era budget position; Deputy War Shipping Administrator;
U.S. Ambassador to the U.K.
John Foster Dulles (1935-1952; Chairman of the Board, 1950-1952): Sullivan and Cromwell
[major multinational law firm]; Princeton; Secretary of State.
Raymond B. Fosdick (1920-1948; President, 1936-1948): Princeton; New York City
Commissioner of Accounts; first Under Secretary for the League of Nations [top U.S.
representative]; various WWI-era War Department positions.
Douglas S. Freeman (1937-1951): Editor, News-Leader [Richmond, VA]; University of
Richmond; John Hopkins; Lecturer, various institutions; >20 honorary degrees; Advisor to
Assistant Secretary of State John J. McCloy [post-WWII].
Herbert S. Gasser (1937-1954): John Hopkins; Washington University; Cornell; Pharmacologist,
Chemical Warfare Service.
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Walter S. Gifford (1936-1950): President, AT&T; Director, First National Bank of New York;
Director, U.S. Steel Corporation.
William I. Myers (1941-1957; Board of Consultants for Agricultural Sciences, 1957-1966):
Director, Continental Can Company; Trustee, Mutual Life Insurance Company; Dea, New York
State College of Agriculture at Cornell; Governor, Farm Credit Administration; Director and
Deputy Chairman, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Thomas I. Parkinson (1935-1946): President, Equitable Life [insurance]; President, Chamber of
Commerce of New York; “director or trustee of many corporations” [NYT]; Dean and Trustee,
Columbia Law; Major, U.S. Army; Legislative Council, U.S. Senate.
Thomas Parran (1941-1958; International Health Division, 1936-1951): St. John’s College;
University of Maryland; Georgetown University; U.S. Surgeon General; New York State
Commissioner of Health; key figure in development of National Institutes of Health and World
Health Organization.
John D. Rockefeller III (1932-1971; Chairman of the Board, 1951-1971; Honorary Chairman
1971-1978): Rockefeller family holdings—Standard Oil, Chase National Bank, many others;
Princeton; Lt. Commander, Office of Chief of Naval Operations; Cultural Consultant to John
Foster Dulles during Japanese peace negotiations; Chair, Commission on Population Growth and
the American Future [presidential appointment under President Nixon].
Robert G. Sproul (1940-1956): University of California; President, University of California;
National Parks Advisory Board.
Walter W. Stewart (1931-1950; Chairman of the Board, 1940-1950): President, Case, Pomeroy
& Co. [investment securities firm]; University of Missouri; Professor, University of Missouri,
University of Michigan, Amherst College; Honorary P.h. D., Missouri, Dartmouth, Amherst,
Columbia, Princeton; American advisor to Bank of England; Federal Reserve Board; Director,
Division of Research and Statistics; American representative, Bank of International Settlements.
Arthur Hays Sulzberger (1939-1957): Publisher and Chairman, New York Times Company; 1 of
3 trustees of Ochs trust [controlling interest of NYT and Chattanooga Times]; Columbia.
Harold H. Swift (1931-1950): Swift & Co. [meat packing firm]; Director, Harris Trust; Director,
Savings Bank of Chicago; University of Chicago; Chairman of the Board, University of Chicago;
Major, Red Cross [presidential appointment under President Wilson].
George H. Whipple (1927-1943): Yale; John Hopkins; Dean, University of California, San
Francisco Medical Center; Dean, University of Rochester Medical Center.
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